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Abstract—Analysis of stream cipher can be done in two ways
(1). Implementation aspects of the design (2). Statistical weakness
of the keystream generated by stream cipher. Our research work
mainly focused on statistical analysis of stream ciphers used in
GSM communications. For a stream cipher to be secure, the
keystream generated by it should be uniformly random (i.e., the
keystream should follow a Bernoulli distribution with parameter
1/2). Statistical tests check whether the given sequence follows a
certain probability distribution. In this paper, statistical analysis
and correlation tests have been applied to various stream ciphers
used in GSM 2G, 3G, 4G and 5G communications to check
for any weaknesses, which have not been done previously. The
sequences output by these ciphers are checked for randomness
using the statistical tests defined by the NIST Test Suite [6].
Furthermore, it should also be not possible to derive any
information about the secret key and the initial state of the cipher
from the keystream. Therefore, additional statistical tests based
on properties like correlation between keystream and key, and
correlation between keystream and Initial Vector (IV) described
in [2] are also performed. Performance analysis of the ciphers
has also been done and the results have been tabulated. Almost
all the ciphers pass the tests in the NIST test suite with 99%
confidence level. For A5/3 stream cipher, the correlation between
the keystream and key is high and correlation between the
keystream and IV is low when compared to other ciphers in
the A5 family.
Index Terms—Stream Ciphers, NIST, Statistical Randomness
Testing, GSM, Correlation, Encryption, Keystream.
I. INTRODUCTION
STREAM CIPHER is an encryption algorithm which takesa short secret key and produces a keystream to be xored
with the clear text message. This is a key dependent algo-
rithm. Stream ciphers are widely used in telecommunication
applications, to provide privacy for communication. Stream
ciphers are efficient and easy to implement in both hardware
and software. They can be used to encrypt / decrypt data in real
time such as encrypting the DVD content, playing back the
content in real time after decryption [15], [16]. However, there
are no sufficient details about the security of stream ciphers
in the literature [14], [25]-[27].
A stream cipher can be viewed as a finite state machine
which takes two inputs: secret key K and a publicly known
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Initial Vector (IV )(optional), and generates a pseudo-random
keystream sequence.
A stream cipher can be attacked either at: Key / Initial
Vector (IV) initialization procedure or at Keystream generation
procedure. (1). Key / Initial Vector (IV) initialization proce-
dure: To check whether the key / IV initialization procedure of
GSM ciphers is secure or not, we performed the tests based on
the correlation between key and keystream and the correlation
between IV and keystream. From our experiments, it has been
observed that there is no flaw in the key and IV initialization
procedure of GSM ciphers (A5 family). All the cryptanalytic
attacks (i.e., Rainbow Table attack, Brute Force, Time-Memory
Trade-Off (TMTO) attacks, Guess and Determine attack, etc.)
have focused on recovering the internal / initial state of a
stream cipher given the keystream. Not many of them have
focused on targeting the key / IV initialization procedure. (2).
Keystream generation procedure: Statistical tests performed on
the keystream usually can not detect any serious weaknesses
of a stream cipher. However, the keystream should pass all
the statistical tests. Otherwise, we can build a distinguisher
which can distinguish the keystream from a random-looking
sequence, which can then be used in a cryptanalytic attack.
The security requirements of a stream cipher are: 1. The
keystream should be indistinguishable from a uniformly ran-
dom sequence. 2. It should not be possible to derive any
information about the secret key and the initial state of the
stream cipher from the keystream.
Statistical tests are performed to know whether the
keystream of a cipher can be distinguished from a truly
random sequence. These tests do not take the inner workings
of the cipher into account. They define test-statistics (cipher-
independent) that can be computed from the keystream. The
probability distribution of the test-statistic under the assump-
tion of randomness is already known. If the probability of
test-statistic value computed from the keystream is below a
certain threshold, then the keystream is distinguishable from
a truly random sequence. Otherwise, it is not.
If correlation between keystream and key or correlation
between keystream and IV is away from 1/2 then it is possible
to guess the key and IV bits, given the keystream, with
probability greater than 1/2.
A. Contribution and Related Work
In this paper, we perform a detailed statistical analysis of
various stream ciphers used in GSM 2G, 3G, 4G and 5G
communications to check for any weaknesses, which have
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not been done previously. In [2], similar statistical analysis
has been applied to synchronous stream ciphers submitted to
ECRYPT [3].
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, various
stream ciphers used in GSM com- munication are described. In
section III, the statistical test based on correlation between the
Keystream and Key & the statistical test based on correlation
between the Keystream and IV [2] are described and also
the results of applying these tests on the GSM ciphers are
provided. The results of applying NIST test suite on all the
ciphers are presented in section VII. Finally, the conclusion is
given in section V.
Abbrevations:
• GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications
• GPRS: General Packet Radio Services (2G & 3G)
• UMTS: Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (3G)
• LTE: Long-Term Evolution (4G)
• EC-GSM-IOT: Extended Coverage GSM for IOT
• 5G-NR: 5G New Radio is the Fifth-Generation wireless air interface
II. STREAM CIPHERS IN GSM COMMUNICATIONS
Definition 1 (Synchronous Stream Cipher [1]): A syn-
chronous stream cipher with key-space {0, 1}κ and IV -space
{0, 1}n consists of
• An internal state of s bits,
• A state initialization function Int : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}s,
• A state update function Udt : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s, and
• An output function Opt : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m.
It takes a key-IV pair (K, IV ) ∈ {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}n as input and
outputs a key stream z = (z1, z2, . . .), where zi ∈ {0, 1}m, as
follows:
(1) compute initial state S0 = Int(K, IV ) ∈ {0, 1}s,
(2) for i = 1, 2, . . .
(2a) output zi = Opt(Si−1),
(2b) update state Si = Udt(Si−1).
A stream cipher is called word-based if m > 1. For m = 1, it
is usually referred to as bit-oriented stream cipher. Both State
Fig. 1. Stream Cipher
update function Udt and output function Opt must satisfy the
following criteria for the cipher to be considered secure:
• It should not be possible to guess the internal state given
the output of the Opt function.
• The Udt function must ensure that the stream cipher has
high period, no matter whatever the internal state the
stream cipher is initially in.
A. Stream Ciphers in Communication
A5/1 [4], [9]-[14] is an LFSR based stream cipher used in
GSM communications and has been developed primarily for
European markets. It takes as input 22 bit IV(frame number)
and a 64 bit key. It has three LFSRs which are irregularly
clocked.
A5/2 [4], [14], [17]-[19] is an LFSR based stream cipher used
in GSM communications and has been developed primarily for
European markets. It takes as input 22 bit IV(frame number)
and a 64 bit key. It has four LFSRs which are irregularly
clocked.
A5/3 [4], [14], [20]-[24] uses KASUMI block cipher in Output
FeedBack (OFB) mode. GSM-3G technology uses A5/3 with
64 bit key and GPRS(GEA3 algorithm) and UMTS(UEA1
algorithm) use A5/3 with 128 bit key for encryption.
SNOW3G [4], [25]-[28] is an LFSR based and has a finite
state machine. It has been used by the various standards both
for encryption and integrity checking as shown in the Table I.
ZUC [4], [25]-[27], [29] is word-based LFSR and uses a non-
TABLE I
APPLICATIONS OF SNOW3G.




5G New Radio (5G-NR) NEA1 NIA1
linear function for producing output. 4G-LTE uses ZUC for
encryption(128-EEA3 algorithm) and also for integrity(128-
EIA3 algorithm:32 bit MAC based ZUC). 5G New Radio (5G-
NR) uses ZUC for encryption(NEA3 algorithm) and also for
integrity (NIA3 algorithm-32 bit MAC based ZUC).
The basic parameters and components of these ciphers are
given in the Table II. The system configuration on which
these algorithms have been run to calculate the throughput is:
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with intel core i7CPU 860@2.80GHZ x8
and OS type: 64-bit. Our study can be useful to the researchers
to check the throughput of their design before implementing
it on Hardware.
III. STATISTICAL TESTS BASED ON CORRELATION
To check whether the key / IV initialization procedure of
stream ciphers used in GSM is secure or not, the correlation
between key and keystream and the correlation between IV and
keystream [2] have been performed on stream ciphers used in
GSM.
A. Correlation Test between Keystream and Key
The aim is to compute the correlation between the
keystream and key. If there is any correlation between the
keystream and key then either the attacker can recover the
secret key using the keystream or it may reduce the search
space of bruteforce attack for finding the secret key. If a stream
cipher fails this test, then it is necessary to revise the key
initialization process.
12 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 16, NO. 1, MARCH 2020
TABLE II
COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY PARAMETERS OF VARIOUS STREAM CIPHERS.
Cipher Key IV Components Application Throughput
Size (Frame) (MBps)
Size



















SNOW3G 128 128 Word based LFSR
and FSM consists
of 3 registers and
two S-boxes.
4G-LTE 0.307698








Let the key size be l and the IV size be m. The test
procedure is as follows [2]:
• Fix IV as a zero vector
• For i = 1 to 1048576(= 220) do
– Generate a random key Ki
– Run the cipher SC(Ki, IV ) and generate the
keystream Zi of length l for each random key Ki
– Find Hamming Weight Wi = HW (Zi⊕Ki), where
0 ≤Wi ≤ l. W ′is are called observed frequencies
• If the probability distribution of these hamming weights
is Binomial(n, p) where n = l and p = 1/2, then the
stream cipher is considered secure
• Compute probabilities of these weights using the bino-
mial distribution (expected frequencies)
• Group these weights into classes so that each class has
approximately the same probability
• Apply χ2-Goodness of Fit Test
• Return p-value
If the hamming weight of a sequence obtained by xoring the
key and keystream is too low/high then it indicates that both
key and keystream are correlated.
This test is applied on the GSM stream ciphers and results
are shown in Table III and Table IV. It is observed that all
p-values are greaterthan or equal to 0.01. Hence these stream
ciphers are secure according to this test.
B. Correlation Test between Keystream and IV
The aim is to compute the correlation between the
keystream and Initial Vector (IV). If there is any correlation
between the keystream and IV then the attacker can generate
(part of) the keystream without having the knowledge of key.
TABLE III
CORRELATION BETWEEN KEYSTREAM AND KEY OF A5 FAMILY (64-BIT
KEY CIPHERS).
CLASS OBSERVED EXPECTED p-value
(Group) A5/1 A5/2 A5/3 A5/1 A5/2 A5/3
A 190180 191029 190680 190866.3974
B 163748 162597 163798 163123.9797
C 292141 292605 292594 292019.2459 0.293 0.512 0.075
D 163044 163127 162959 163123.9797
E 190887 190642 189969 190866.3974
TABLE IV
CORRELATION TEST BETWEEN KEYSTREAM AND KEY OF ZUC AND
SNOW3G (128-BIT KEY CIPHERS).
CLASS OBSERVED EXPECTED p-value
(Group) ZUC SNOW3G ZUC SNOW3G
A 164926 165545 165467.9145
B 229951 230462 230035.8102
C 209046 209288 208992.5506 0.2172 0.5034
D 230917 229786 230035.8102
E 165160 164919 165467.9145
If a stream cipher fails this test, then it is necessary to revise
the IV initialization process.
Let the key size be l and the IV size be m. The test
procedure is as follows [2]:
• Choose a random secret key K
• For i = 1 to 1048576(= 220) do
– Generate a random Initial Vector IV i
– Run the cipher SC(K, IV i) and generate the
keystream Zi of length m for each random IV i
– Find Hamming Weight Wi = HW (Zi⊕IV i), where
0 ≤Wi ≤ m. W ′isare called observed frequencies
• If the probability distribution of these hamming weights
is Binomial(n, p) where n = m and p = 1/2, then the
stream cipher is considered secure
• Compute probabilities of these weights using the bino-
mial distribution (expected frequencies)
• Group these weights into classes so that each class has
approximately the same probability
• Apply χ2-Goodness of Fit Test
• Return p-value
If the hamming weight of a sequence obtained by xoring
the IV and keystream is too low/high then it indicates that
both IV and keystream are correlated.Small weights shows a
positive correlation, i.e. there is a similarity between IV and
its corresponding keystream. High weights shows that the IV
and keystream are negatively correlated.
This test is applied on the GSM stream ciphers and results
are shown in Table V and Table VI. It is observed that all
p-values are greaterthan or equal to 0.01. Hence these stream
ciphers are secure according to this test.
IV. RANDOMNESS TESTS
Randomness tests check the degree of approximation of
the given binary sequence to a truly random sequence. This
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TABLE V
CORRELATION BETWEEN KEYSTREAM AND IV OF A5 FAMILY (64-BIT
KEY CIPHERS).
CLASS OBSERVED EXPECTED p-value
(Group) A5/1 A5/2 A5/3 A5/1 A5/2 A5/3
A 260736 261289 261832 261733.532
B 154162 154595 154155 154172.421
C 168834 168477 167981 168188.095 0.149 0.141 0.892
D 154432 154721 154495 154172.421
E 261836 260918 261537 261733.532
TABLE VI
CORRELATION BETWEEN KEYSTREAM AND IV OF ZUC AND SNOW3G
(128-BIT KEY CIPHERS).
CLASS OBSERVED EXPECTED p-value
(Group) ZUC SNOW3G ZUC SNOW3G
A 165433 165074 165467.9145
B 229504 229573 230035.8102
C 209526 208993 208992.5506 0.2115 0.4239
D 229497 230415 230035.8102
E 166040 165945 165467.9144
Fig. 2. Frequency Test
Fig. 3. Block Frequency Test
is usually done through the use of a test-statistic. This test-
statistic follows a certain probability distribution P0 for a truly
random sequence. The test-statistic value v0 is computed for
the given binary sequence to be tested and the probability that
the test-statistic assumes the value v0 under the probability
distribution P0 is computed (This probability is known as p-
value). If the p-value is greater than certain threshold, then the
binary sequence is considered to be truly random. Otherwise,
it is not.
The test suites which are available in the literature for
performing randomness tests are: NIST [6], DIEHARD [7],
and Federal Information Processing Standard tests (FIPS) [8]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
Fig. 4. Runs Test
Fig. 5. Longest Runs Test
developed 15 randomness tests to test the randomness of
the sequences. Every statistical test defined in the NIST test
suite takes the sequence output by a Pseudo Random Number
Generator (PRNG) as input and outputs whether sequence is
random (according to property specified by the test) or not.
If any of the sequence output by a PRNG is not random
(based on some statistical test), we say that it is not a PRNG.
Since we want to check whether the stream ciphers behave
as pseudo-random bit generators (PRBG), we apply statistical
tests on the sequence output by the stream cipher. Key stream
of size 1048576 has been generated from each stream cipher
mentioned in section II. The following inputs are given to











– Key: 0xaaaaaaaa 0x1234bbbb 0xbbbbbbbb 0xcccccccc
– IV: 0xabcdabcd 0x11111111 0xabcdabcd 0x22222222
• ZUC
– Key: 0x41 0x42 0x43 0x44 0x45 0x46 0x47 0x48 0x49 0x4a 0x4b
0x4c 0x4d 0x4d 0x4e 0x4f 0x50
– IV: 0x84 0x31 0x9a 0xa8 0xde 0x69 0x15 0xca 0x1f 0x6b 0xda
0x6b 0xfb 0xd8 0xc7 0x66
A p-value is determined for each test in the NIST test suite.
If p = 1 then the given keystream is said to be perfectly
random sequence and if p = 0 then the given keystream is
said to be non-random sequence. The significance level α for
the tests is selected to be 0.01. If p ≥ α = 0.01 then with
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Fig. 6. Rank Test
Fig. 7. DFT Test
confidence level 99%, we can say that the generated keystream
is random and if p < α = 0.01 then the keystream is said to
be non-random with confidence level of 99%.
Fig. 8. Overlapping Test
Fig. 9. Universal Test
The NIST test suite [2], [5], [6] is applied on each generated
keystream and results are tabulated in the Table VII. The p-
values of all the ciphers for each test have been depicted
graphically from Fig. 2 to Fig. 15. Almost all the ciphers
pass the tests in NIST test suite with 99% confidence level.
From the figures Fig. 2 to Fig. 15, one can observe that
p-values are higher for some cipher which means that it
possesses statistical properties similar to that of a random
sequence when compared to other ciphers. For example, the
frequency test checks the proportion of number of 1s and 0s
in the given sequence and checks the difference falls within
the limit of randomness. According to this test, from the
Fig. 2, the keystrem generated by A5/2 has highest p-value
0.811663 and ZUC has lowest p-value 0.096491. From the
Table VII, keystream generated by ZUC has p-value 1.000000
in 6th of 18 sub-tests in Random Excursions Variant Test.
Non-overlapping template matching test has 148 sub-tests. It
searches for the pre-specified m-bit string in a given sequence
of keystream bits and examine whether the number of such
occurences are within the statistical limit of a sequence.
None of the ciphers passed all the 148 sub-tests. Keystreams
produced by A5/1, A5/2, A5/3, ZUC, and SNOW3G have
passed 129, 132, 136, 136, and 134 sub-tests respectively out
of 148 tests.
Fig. 10. Linear Complexity Test
Fig. 11. Serial Test-1
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Fig. 12. Serial Test-1
Fig. 13. Approximate Entropy Test
Fig. 14. Cumulative Sums Test (Forward)
Fig. 15. Cumulative Sums Test (Reverse)
TABLE VII
NIST TEST SUITE RESULTS.
Test p-values
A5/1 A5/2 A5/3 ZUC SNOW3G
1. Frequency
(Monobit) Test
0.778519 0.811663 0.688869 0.096491 0.781516
2. Frequency Test
within a Block
0.778519 0.774172 0.615560 0.835373 0.780045
3. Runs Test 0.796492 0.393404 0.684444 0.966320 0.480715
4. Test for the
Longest Run of
Ones in a Block
0.667237 0.399498 0.060836 0.270085 0.574408
5. Binary Matrix
Rank Test









out of 148 Sub-
Tests)








0.156069 0.761597 0.009726 0.915651 0.103432
10. Linear Com-
plexity Test
0.379353 0.276610 0.109078 0.766208 0.328045
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, performance analysis, randomness tests, cor-
relation between keystream and key, and correlation between
keystream and IV are applied on GSM Stream Ciphers and
results are tabulated and compared.
From the comparision of tests, one can observe that it is very
difficult to find the relationship between the design structure
and randomness p-values.
If a stream cipher fails a particular statistical test then with
100% probability, it can be distinguished from a truly random
sequence. However, if a stream cipher passes a particular
statistical test then with 100% probability it can not be proved
that it is indistinguishable from a truly random sequence. This
is because there are infinitely many statistical tests that can be
applied to a keystream. However, passing all of them does not
ensure that stream cipher is secure against all cryptanalytic
attacks. Therefore, the statistical analysis that is performed
in this paper is a necessary but not sufficient condition to
prove that a stream cipher is secure. However, if it fails any
of them, a cryptanalytic attack can be launched against the
stream cipher.
Our work focused on statistical analysis of pseudo random
keystream sequence generated by the stream ciphers used
in GSM communications. Based on our approach one can
understand that: (1). If there is a correlation between key and
key stream then key initialization process should be revised.
(2). If there is a correlation between Initial vector and key
stream then IV initialization process should be revised. There
are other correlation tests in the literature that have to be
applied on GSM ciphers as a future work.
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